



ROCK AND A POLITICAL
HARD PLACE – 
MICHAEL BOLLE* AND
OLIVER PAMP**1
With the accession of the new member states in
2004, it was widely taken for granted that the subse-
quent introduction of the euro in these countries
would merely be a formality – a purely technical
process.Indeed,at the outset,all countries of central
and eastern Europe (CEEC)2 voiced their intention
to join the eurozone as soon as possible. Two years
later, much of this momentum has been lost. Of all
CEECs, only Slovenia will manage to introduce the
common currency already on 1 January 2007. All
other countries have either not committed them-
selves to the fulfilment of the economic conditions
for eurozone membership or have not managed to
meet them yet. Estonia and Lithuania, which also
aimed at a eurozone membership in 2007, had to
postpone their entries. The same holds for Latvia
whose target date of 2008 was revoked recently by
the government. The Baltic states’ difficulties stem
from their high inflation rates which are at odds with
one of the stipulations of the Maastricht conver-
gence criteria.3 However, they along with Slovenia
and Slovakia have already taken the road towards
the euro by entering the fixed exchange rate mecha-
nism (ERM II), a step that has not even been taken
yet by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.
Indeed, these latter countries have either only
announced a vague entry date for 2010 (Czech Re-
public and Hungary) or do not even have a target
date at all (Poland).
This begs the question of why this allegedly technical
procedure has stalled recently,especially in the three
biggest states. We maintain in this article that not
only inconsistencies in the Maastricht criteria, as is
often claimed in the economic debate,are the reason
for these difficulties.Rather,in a context of real con-
vergence, the economic prerequisites of EMU mem-
bership are at odds with the political incentives that
decision-makers face in their countries. There is no
doubt that EMU membership offers the prospect of
economic gains; as De Grauwe and Schnabl (2004,
243) correctly put it: “The CEE countries have the
unique opportunity to complete the catch-up process
of an emerging market with the interest rate of a
highly developed economy.” The usual questions
apply, however: who will benefit, when do benefits
materialize and how much of these benefits can be
reaped? There will be losers and winners in this
process, and even winners may want to have their
benefits now rather than twenty years from now. In
a democratic society, and we are talking about
democracies here, these preferences will not only be
expressed economically in the market place but also
politically by the act of voting. If voters are myopic
and biased towards present consumption, they will
reward governments who promise present consump-
tion and punish those that ask them to wait.
Governments seeking majorities in the voting
process may be tempted not only to promise imme-
diate higher consumption, but also to deliver it by
increasing transfers, cutting taxes on households,
providing subsidies and public goods for consump-
tion. The resulting budget deficit may hamper
growth and increase the danger of inflation but
secure political survival and societal support for the
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EU. The immediate political
costs associated with necessary
economic reforms may induce
policy makers particularly in the
bigger CEECs to postpone nec-
essary economic adjustment re-
quired for entering the euro-
zone. The economic rationale
may thus conflict with the politi-
cal rationale.
Long-term prospects and 
short-term solutions
As is often the case, telling the
story of a political dilemma
starts within an economic context. Comparing the
current per capita income levels of the CEECs with
those of the eurozone average and projecting them
into the future shows that all CEECs will still need at
least one or two generations to catch up with the
eurozone member states (see Table 1).
It seems reasonable to assume that new member
states will try to speed up the catching-up process.
High growth rates require high investment rates.Yet
the new member states feature low domestic saving
rates. The result is that, with the exception of
Slovenia,all of these countries exhibit a considerable
savings gap, with Estonia leading the pack with a
striking 15.7 percent difference (see Figure 1). This
imbalance is reflected in large current account
deficits that are needed to fill the gap between sav-
ing and investment rates. These range from around
2 percent in Slovenia to as high as almost 13 percent
in Estonia (see Figure 2).
The negative difference between exports and im-
ports of goods and services can be considered as the
continued use of foreign savings. From the point of
view of welfare economics,this can be understood as
imports of resources. From a monetary perspective,
this implies capital imports to finance the current
account deficit and to stabilize the exchange rate.To
run a high current account deficit is a risky strategy.
It entails volatilities and may easily end up in a cur-
rency and banking crisis.The inflow of foreign capi-
tal needed to stabilize the
exchange rate cannot be taken
for granted. The very open
CEEC are not the U.S., their
financial markets are rather
small and less deep, and their
currencies are not the US dollar.
Recent experiences in Asia and
Latin America give testimony to
the havoc wreaked when inves-
tor sentiments turn sour. Hence,
although some economists have
argued that from a theoretical
perspective there should be no
reason to be concerned about
current account deficits (Sachs
1981), recent lessons of many
emerging markets should pro-
vide a warning that in the medi-
um- to long-run CEECs’ exter-
Table 1 
Time for convergence to 100% of EMU-GDP per capita  
for different growth scenarios 
Country 
Average growth  
2000 to 2005 continued 
(average growth rates in 
brackets) 
at 8% growth rate 
Slovenia  34 years (3.37%)  10 years 
Czech Republic  53 years (3.79%)  19 years 
Hungary  43 years (4.65%)  21 years 
Estonia  21 years (8.04%)  21 years 
Poland  76 years (3.39%)  23 years 
Slovak Republic  52 years (4.43%)  24 years 
Lithuania  25 years (7.58%)  24 years 
Latvia  21 years (7.20%)  23 years 
Romania  54 years (5.76%)  36 years 
Bulgaria  53 years (6.05%)  37 years 
Notes: Base year is 2005. EMU’s per capital GDP is assumed to grow by 1.5%
per year.  Countries have been ranked according to the level of real convergence
achieved in 2005.  
















Source: World Development Indicators 2006.
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Figure 1nal imbalances could pose a threat to macroeconom-
ic stability (Edwards 2004). In the long run, large
current account deficits imply risks for monetary sta-
bility as well as the fundamentals of an economy,
even if most capital inflows to the CEEC are still for-
eign direct investments rather than more volatile
portfolio flows. Yet despite these risks, in the short
run CEECs have no politically viable alternative to a
current account deficit route if they want to pursue
fast economic catching-up.
This all holds true for transition economies every-
where. For the CEEC, however, entering the EU in
2004 has helped a lot to stabilize capital inflows
because it fuelled favourable market expectations
about future economic stability and growth. These
positive expectations would be even reinforced in
case of EMU membership. Joining a single currency
abolishes the currency risk and reduces the inflation
risk.Therefore, expected eurozone membership fur-
ther increases the confidence of international finan-
cial markets. It helps to ensure that capital keeps on
coming in and makes large current account deficits
less risky in the medium run.
From a purely economic perspective, the policy pre-
scriptions seem to be clear: enter EMU as fast as
possible to reduce the danger of currency-induced
volatilities. If CEECs wait too long, the result could
be large exchange rate movements, which may
induce sudden current account corrections; or a cur-
rency crisis could be triggered by strong current
account movements. If markets become convinced
that the euro will not be introduced eventually, then
capital could be redirected.Often voiced recommen-
dations that these countries should finish their struc-
tural reforms or complete real
convergence first, seem ill
advised. The risks associated
with such a delay are not worth
taking.
To ensure a steady inflow of cap-
ital, favourable conditions are
needed: price stability is para-
mount.There is already pressure
on prices from the supply side
because of the productivity
catch-up in these countries. To
prevent high inflation, domestic
demand has to be in equilibrium
with overall supply. This implies
that the burden of macroeco-
nomic stability lies on fiscal policy. The size of the
needed fiscal adjustment depends on the size of the
current account deficit given continued low saving
rates and the need for high investment rates.
Estimating sustainable levels of the current account
is complicated, however, and necessarily depends on
the methodology employed and the underlying
assumptions about steady state values of the impor-
tant economic variables. However, if the currently
slower growing CEEC, such as Hungary or Poland,
tried to speed up the convergence process, then the
burden on fiscal policy would be heavier still. Even a
simple back-of-the-envelope projection for these
countries would end up with very high investment
rates and extreme current account deficits,given cur-
rent low private saving rates and a growth rate of,for
example, 8 percent.4 This would call for a very pru-
dent fiscal policy with extremely low deficits. Some
governments would even have to run budget surplus-
es to ensure macroeconomic equilibrium between
supply and demand and to prevent demand-driven
inflation.5 This is especially true for the big CEEC
with their high fiscal deficits. What this reasoning
implies is that the 3 percent deficit margin of the
Maastricht fiscal criterion seems to be rather too gen-
erous for most of these countries.Table 2 provides an
overview of country-specific growth rates (averages
of 2003 to 2005) and the country-specific situation of
the general government balances. The last column
displays some, however crude, assessments of the
needs for fiscal adjustment if countries want to speed
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4While this seems to be an extraordinary high growth rate,it has to
be noted that the Baltic countries had even higher ones in the last
few years.
5 Precise quantitative estimates depend on a number of crucial
assumptions of, for example, private saving rates and the marginal
product of capital. That is why we only point out the qualitative




politically hard to sell
up economic growth. No star points to a somewhat
comfortable situation with regard to the budget bal-
ance (like in Estonia),one star (like for Romania and
Slovenia) indicates the need for moderate consolida-
tion efforts.A country with two stars seems to be in a
bad situation because it would need a reduction in its
fiscal deficit to achieve the goal of a higher growth
rate at stable prices given the necessary current
account deficit.
An economic rock … 
There are quite some lessons to be learnt.The most
important one is that fiscal policy becomes a depen-
dent variable and is no longer at the discretion of
policy makers. The economic rationale of the catch-
up process requires a specific budget strategy to
ensure macroeconomic equilibrium,thereby stabiliz-
ing low inflation rates and creating confidence in the
sustainability of the current account deficit. How-
ever, politically this may be very hard to sell. It may
be even harder to sell the decision of joining ERM II
right away and, later, the eurozone. These decisions
entail forgoing monetary sovereignty and the
inevitable loss of the exchange rate and monetary
policy as policy instruments.This may not come with
high costs for small countries, like the Baltics with
their already existing currency board arrangements.
As the discussion above amply demonstrated, fiscal
policy also has only a very limited capacity as a
macroeconomic instrument, which will leave
CEECs, once in ERM II, without any macroeco-
nomic instrument at all.6 The burden of adjustment
would then be on wages, prices and employment.At
this stage, this seems to be unacceptable for the big
CEEC.
Fulfilling the Maastricht inflation criterion is also
not an easy task because it may be judged as overly
restrictive. First, ECB monetary policy is based on
the eurozone inflation average, whereas the Maas-
tricht inflation criterion judges price stability in com-
parison to the three EMU countries with the highest
price stability. Secondly, the inflation criterion does
not take into account that transition countries have
structurally higher inflation rates due to the catch-up
process itself, which entails different productivity
developments in sectors of tradable and non-trad-
able goods. The former sector, exposed to interna-
tional competition, experiences higher productivity
leaps than purely domestic sectors.As a result,prices
and wages in the latter are also pushed up leading to
a surge in inflation – the famous Balassa-Samuelson
effect.
This productivity induced price pressure could be
solved by letting the currency appreciate. Yet, the
exchange rate criterion demands that countries will-
ing to join EMU peg their currency to the euro for at
least two years,obeying a narrow fluctuation band of
2.25 percent.7 This is not enough room to accommo-
Table 2 










budget close to balance
or in surplus  
General government
budget of  – 3% or
lower  
Fiscal adjustment
needed for  
8% growth  
Bulgaria   x  x    
Czech Republic    x   x  ** 
Estonia   x    x    
Hungary   x   x  ** 
Latvia   x        
Lithuania x       
Poland   x   x  ** 
Romania   x     * 
Slovak Republic    x   x  ** 
Slovenia   x     * 
Note: Growth rates and general government balances are averages of 2003 to 2005. 
Sources: Eurostat, WDI. 
6 Recent conflicts about monetary policy and “blame games”
between governments and central banks in Poland (in 2002) and
Hungary (ongoing), as well as reform efforts that reduce the inde-
pendence of the central bank (Czech Republic in 2000), give testi-
mony to the ongoing struggle of policy makers to keep monetary
policy in their reach.
7 ERM II came into being in 1997 and has actually a standard fluc-
tuation band of ± 15 percent. Nevertheless, the Commission decid-
ed to apply the 2.25 percent band of ERM I as an exchange rate cri-
terion. Note that ERM I de facto collapsed in 1993 due to massive
speculative attacks, making the Commission’s insistence on apply-
ing the narrow fluctuation margin hard to understand.date the inflationary pressures created by the catch-
up process, thereby rendering it very hard for coun-
tries observing high economic growth rates to fulfil
both the inflation and the exchange rate criterion
simultaneously. Indeed, Estonia and Lithuania,
which could not even exploit the 2.25 percent margin
because they run currency board arrangements that
are permitted within the ERM II framework, failed
to qualify for eurozone membership in 2007 because
they missed the inflation target.
Moreover, ERM II is a tricky economic prerequisite
for another reason. As has been forcefully argued
before (Begg et al. 2003), a soft peg regime such as
ERM II combined with a completely liberalized cap-
ital account, which is mandated by the acquis com-
munautaire, may become very vulnerable to curren-
cy distress and may therefore lead to sudden current
account corrections, endangering the convergence
process. Capital flows would become more volatile,
and more short-term portfolio flows would be
attracted under such a regime.
As a result, CEECs are faced with an inflation crite-
rion that is a little bit too strict and in combination
with ERM II somewhat contradictory, as well as an
exchange rate criterion that is potentially risky.
… and the political hard place
Given these economic rocks, a reasonable econom-
ic policy is necessary, especially with respect to the
timing of accession. EMU entry should not be
delayed for too long, because CEECs need to
ensure the stability of the current account.Yet, too
fast an approach is also not viable because the
political challenges associated with meeting the
prerequisites for euro adoption are even more
daunting.We know from modern political economy
research that politicians do respond to short-term
electoral pressures that are not necessarily in line
with the long-run needs of the economy.Therefore,
economic policy serves as a tool to garner votes,
and policies that are damaging at the polls will
rarely be enacted.
Accession to the European Union has created high
hopes among the people in the CEECs for a fast
increase in their standards of living.These hopes may
be easily disappointed. A Eurobarometer poll one
year after EU accession showed that 74 percent of
the respondents in the new member states consid-
ered their economic situation to be “bad”(European
Commission 2005). Thus, governments are expected
to deliver exceptional growth rates (as is currently
the case in the Baltic states) or face serious electoral
punishment. The political instability currently
observed in some CEECs regarding government
durability can be partly attributed to disappoint-
ments stemming from the gap between personal eco-
nomic gains and individual expectations – Poland,
Bulgaria and Hungary are only a few recent exam-
ples in this respect.
Voters in CEECs have a clear benchmark for their
expectations, which is the income level of the west-
ern European countries. They expect fast conver-
gence to these standards. We have shown above
that this takes at least one or two generations (see
Table 1). It is reasonable to assume that voters are
much more short-sighted. They want to have the
cake now and eat it soon.This is the catch: growth
is needed for economic convergence, but at the
same time the populaces yearn for fast increases in
consumption. This dilemma translates into the
challenges for fiscal policy and the government
budget. On the one hand, the economic rationale
requires fiscal discipline given the aim of long-run
growth. On the other hand, voters want govern-
ments to enable public and private consumption.8
This may help to explain why many of the CEECs
boast such high public expenditure rates given
their level of economic development, with Hun-
gary even exhibiting an expenditure rate of more
than 50 percent of GDP. If governments follow the
economic rationale, re-election is seriously at risk.
If they follow the political rationale, they may stay
in power but a fast increase in economic wealth
will not be attainable.
Looking at the expenditure rates of the CEECs, it
is evident that the bigger countries, which tend to
be more heterogeneous in terms of preference dis-
tributions and social cleavages within the popula-
tion, exhibit higher spending levels. Parties and
candidates compete for political power by offering
pork and redistribution: the more diverse the pop-
ulace,the more spending is needed to secure office.
This is even more necessary once economic growth
slows down.




criterion may be too
demanding
8 Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2006) try to explain the prefer-
ences for redistribution of west Germans and east Germans. They
find that people who grew up in the Communist part have much
stronger preferences for redistribution and state intervention.They
attribute these finding to the experience of a paternalistic,intrusive
state under socialism. We would expect the same pattern in all
CEECs, since they all share a similar socialist experience.CESifo Forum 4/2006 27
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The three bis CEEC
have no incentives to
incur the economic
and political costs of
EMU but are obliged
to introduce the euro
From this perspective, the Baltic
states are in a favourable posi-
tion: they are small, and had
enormous growth rates in the
last two years, ranging from 7.5
percent in Lithuania up to 10.8
percent in Latvia. As a result, a
political window of opportunity
to enter EMU has opened up there. However, the
tight inflation criterion prohibits their quick acces-
sion. It is doubtful that even under these favourable
economic circumstances, governments have the
political willingness to implement the austerity mea-
sures that would be needed to curb inflation.
The three biggest CEEC are in the trickiest situa-
tion, and similar arguments could also be made with
respect to Slovakia. They have rather high fiscal
deficits, not only compared to the 3 percent Maas-
tricht criterion but also with respect to what would
be necessary given their current account deficits (see
Table 3).Yet engaging in budgetary retrenchment is
politically difficult.As a result, entering the ERM II
straightjacket is postponed and the eurozone is offi-
cially considered as not advisable (a position cur-
rently taken by Poland). Political decision makers
simply have no incentive in these countries to take
on the front-loaded costs of approaching EMU
membership, demanding painful fiscal adjustment
and the giving up of the monetary emergency exit.
The costs are immediate and would be felt at the
next elections, while the timing for reaping the ben-
efits remains unclear. The EMU entry date is not
fixed and depends on the fulfilment of the not-easy-
to-achieve and somewhat contradictory inflation and
exchange rate criteria. Policy makers would lose
their last crucial economic instrument that is a valu-
able tool for political competition.
Given this political dilemma, we do not expect the
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to change
their current reluctance to introduce the euro any-
time soon.Given the current growth rates,budgetary
conflicts and the political dilemmas pointed out
above, we attempted to make an informed guess
about EMU entry prospects; these are summarized
in Table 3.
The Baltic states are on track and should therefore
manage to introduce the euro, once the inflation cri-
terion is fulfilled.This will happen when the current-
ly very high growth rates slow down and the strong
growth in domestic demand recedes. Slovakia is in a
somewhat unclear position, having entered ERM II,
but still needing to consolidate its budget.The Czech
Republic suffers from the problems explained
above, but very recently experienced a surge in eco-
nomic growth, which could open up a window of
opportunity for policy makers. Finally, Hungary and
Poland are in a situation in which striving towards
the euro seems politically not viable. We expect
them, just as Sweden, to postpone EMU entry for
the foreseeable future.
Evasion tactics and how to prevent another Sweden 
All CEECs are so-called ‘members with a deroga-
tion’ and are obliged to introduce the euro once
they fulfil the Maastricht requirements. Unlike
Great Britain and Denmark, they do not have an
opt-out clause. However, the belief that the euro is
simply an option is widespread in the CEECs. A
recent Eurobarometer poll (2006) showed that in
every CEEC surveyed (Bulgaria and Romania were
not included), a great majority of the respondents
thought that euro introduction is not obligatory.As
a result, a strategy of blaming the need for painful
fiscal adjustments on the introduction of the euro
will not work in any of these countries. Sweden pro-
vides a good example of how to avoid the euro.
Countries not willing to incur the economic and
political costs may follow this example and post-
pone entry into ERM II – indefinitely if politically
necessary.
Given these economic and political realities and to
ensure sustainability of the CEECs’ economic catch-
up strategy, fast entry into EMU is essential. If mar-
ket participants became convinced that a country
would not introduce the euro in the foreseeable
future, a redirecting of capital flows to other CEEC
would likely occur,entailing a current account rever-
sal with all its adverse consequences for financial sta-
bility and sustainable economic growth. Hence, a
combination of domestic policy measures and politi-
cal incentives by the EU seems to be necessary.
Introducing the right institutions might help mitigate
the political obstacles.
Table 3 
Possible Scenarios for EMU entry 
Fast entry 
2007
By 2010  Intermediate, 
still unclear  







Slovakia Czech  Republic  Hungary, 
Poland At the domestic level,CEECs should encourage pri-
vate savings to reduce the current account deficit in
the long run.This could be achieved,for example,by
introducing pension reforms that induce households
to rely less heavily on pay-as-you go pension
schemes and more on personal savings (see Bolle
and Pamp, forthcoming). Some CEECs have started
moving in that direction, but much more is needed.
In addition, growth strategies of the CEECs have to
be linked to a strengthening of the export base,
thereby diminishing the current account deficit.
Both of these strategies are aimed at the medium to
long run.Nevertheless,CEECs have to stabilize cap-
ital inflows by widening and deepening domestic
financial markets. Given high capital inflows, effi-
cient allocation becomes paramount and overheat-
ing as well as asset-price bubbles are serious threats
in fast growing transition economies (see Bolle and
Meyer, 2004).
Beyond domestic efforts, the European Union
should engage in technical as well as financial assis-
tance to help CEECs tackling their budgetary dilem-
ma.With regard to technical assistance at the domes-
tic level,one may think of introducing budgeting sys-
tems for improved governance like “Zero Base” and
“Outcome Focused Budgeting” in Great Britain
(Ellis and Mitchell 2002). At the European level,
already existing budget coordination mechanisms in
the framework of the broad economic policy guide-
lines could be strengthened with the help of institu-
tions like the Bureau of European Policy Advisers
(BEPA). This may even lead to an annual review
process of the progress made by CEECs towards
EMU membership. This would resemble the pre-
accession process, where the Commission closely
monitored progress and published annual reports.
This institution building could be complemented by
financial assistance in a similar way as the EU’s pre-
accession instruments that provided funds to CEECs
in return for commitments to implement the prereq-
uisites of EU accession. Countries undertaking the
necessary steps towards the eurozone could be
financially rewarded through investment grants that
should be earmarked for investment spending. The
institutional and financial incentives together could
also help domestic policy makers in CEECs to play
soft tight-hand strategies with their voters.
Eurozone enlargement is a political process.
Simply telling the CEECs to reduce their budget
deficits and in some cases even create surpluses is
not an advice that policy makers in those countries
could follow easily, given high hopes of the popu-
lace and next elections always just around the cor-
ner. Providing positive political incentives and
offering external constraints would make it easier
for policy makers to implement the necessary eco-
nomic steps.
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Beyond domestic
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deficits, the EU should
give technical 
assistance